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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------------- oOo) --------------STATE OF UTAH,
)

Supreme Court No. 14211

Plaintiff-Respondent,
)

-vs)

BILLY WAYNE BLACK,
)

Defendant-Appellant.
)

oOo
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from the conviction of murder in the
second degree and a sentence and commitment of from five years
to life imprisonment at hard labor at the Utah State Prison.
The case was tried before a iury with the Honorable J. Robert
Bullock presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with the
crime of murder in the second degree (R.21).

Appellant entered

a plea of not guilty (R.23) and the matter proceeded to trial
by jury.

Part way through the prosecution's case, appellant

twice moved for a mistrial after observing conversation and
displays of familiarity between jurors and certain of the
prosecuting officials. (T. 74,107-109, 145).
-1-

When the court

denied the second of defendant's motions for a mistrial
based on jury prejudice, defendant moved to dismiss the
jury and asked to exercise his right to waive trial by jury
and have all issues of fact determined by the trial judge
(T.l45-154).

The trial judge took defendant's motion to

waive trial by jury and the motion to dismiss for lack of
evidence under advisement and ordered the trial to proceed
(T.l39,145-154).

The jury returned a verdict of guilty of

second degree murder (R.73).

The appellant timely moved

for a judgment of acquittal and/or for a new trial (R.93,95).
After a hearing, the court denied the motions and sentenced
appellant to serve a term of five years to life imprisonment
at hard labor at the Utah State Prison.(R.96).

Appellant was

forthwith committed to the prison to begin serving his
sentence.

Defendant/appellant now appeals from the verdict

and judgment entered.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and judgment of the lower court and a dismissal of the action, or in
the alternative, reversal and remand for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 19, 1972, at 2 :30 a.m., two Orem City
police officers observed an orange and black Chevrolet proceeding
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southbound on State Street towards Provo City "at a high
rate of speed."

They gave chase in separate vehicles and

overtook the speeding auto after it stopped at the Emergency
Room of the Utah Valley Hospital.

The officers approached

the driver, appellant Black, and were advised that he had
an "emergency 11 (T.60,79).

A nude, bleeding female body was

removed from the front seat of the Chevrolet by the police
and hospital attendants (T.80).

The body was warm and

believed to be alive upon arrival at the hospital (T.61),
however, the girl was pronounced dead upon inspection by a
hospital doctor (T.80).

Dr. Terry H. Rich, testifying at

trial, stated the death 'was secondary to a gunshot wound
to the head" (T .49).
The officers asked Mr. Black for identification
and he provided them with a drivers license listing his name
as Billy Robinson (Ex.l).

He also delivered to them the

deceased's drivers license (Ex.2) and the keys to the automobile (T.66,81).

When asked what happened he told the

officers he had come home and found his wife in that condition (T.93).

While the police were pursuing their investi-

gation, Mr. Black walked out of the hospital and disappeared
(T. 95).

Decedent's employer testified that the deceased
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had left the bar where she was working in the company (>f
Mr. Black at approximately 1:00 a.m., on the morning of her
death (R.28).

At 1:15 a'.m., a tenant in room 96 of the

"Alpine Villa Motel" in Pleasant Grove stated that he was
awakened by loud television and shouting coming from room 97,
an adjoining room occupied by deceased (T.l21).

He

te~stified

that a man in a loud voice was berating a woman for "dancing"
with another man.

He stated there was considerable vulgarity,

name calling, and sounds of "slapping."

He stated a ,woman's

voice kept pleading, "Please, Billy, don't hit me any more.
Please stop."

(To 122).

The man was overheard to state, "I ought to kill
you both" and, "I'm going to leave you to him,"
and she was heard to reply, "Please don't go.
you to go. "

(T. 126).

(T .122)
I don'' t want

The man's voice demanded to know

where the rest of the money was and he ordered her to pack
his suitcase.
After hearing the door to the apartment open and
shut twice and patches of conversation, including, '''take it
off," "sit down," and, "turn around," the witness stated
that all was "pretty quiet" and music was playing and that
he "relaxed," thinking, "It was all over with."

Later, he

was awakened a second time by a "gunshot" followed by the
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exclamation, "God, honey, I didn't mean to do it!"

He

stated he then heard, "a shuffling of footsteps and the
door open, slam.

Then I heard a car door open and slam,

and the lights came on and the motor started • • • • I could
see the car going down the road • • • • so I looked at my
clock, and it was 2:30."

(T.l27).

He stated that, "less than a minute" elapsed
between the gunshot report and the departure of the automobile and that it occurred, "just about as fast as it could
happen."

(T.l28).
After observing these events, the witness returned

to his bed and "listened for any movement" but did nothing
to check out the nature of the circumstances related.

He did

not call the police or notify anyone and said nothing to
anyone until contacted by the police several hours later
(T.l30).
Mr. Black, testifying in his own behalf, described
the events of the evening in question.

He stated that he

and the decedent had been drinking and that he had consumed
fifteen bottles of beer at a cocktail lounge where she was
working (T.l58).

He stated they argued on the way home

over her activities at the cocktail lounge and that when
they arrived at the apartment she took a shower.

-5-

He stated

that before she dressed they got into a second argument and
he announced he was leaving.

He stated that she told him

not to go and slapped him and in retaliation he jerked her
bra off (T.l59).

He acknowledged that additional slapping

took place and that each was involved (T.l60).

He stated

he began packing his belongings and took some of his things
to the automobile.

He stated that when he picked up his

twenty-two caliber pistol from the bed it accidentally discharged (T.l61) and when he observed that she had been hit,
he grabbed her, placed her in the car and took her to the
hospital, driving at speeds "in excess of 100 miles an
hour."

(T.l62).

ARGUMENT
POINT Io
APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE TRIAL
JUDGE FAILED TO EXAMINE THE JURORS TO DISCLOSE PREJUDICIAL
FAMILIARITY WITH PROSECUTING WITNESSES AND DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL WHEN SUCH WAS DISCLOSED.
Soon after the jury was impaneled and witnesses had
begun testifying,the conduct of certain jurors began to raise
questions as to their suitability as impartial fact f:i.nders.
The court was alerted that a juror named Holman appea:red to
be more intent on observing Chief Michael Ferre than he was
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on listening to the testimony of witnesses (T.74).

It was

later learned that Holman had been acquainted with Chief
Ferre for "30 to 35 years" and had lived for a time as
"aero ss -the-street neighbors" (T. 224).
Appellant's motion for mistrial on the grounds
that the undisclosed familiarity and friendship between the
two prejudiced appellant's rights to a fair and impartial
jury trial, was denied (T.llO}.
Shortly thereafter, a second juror named Laursen
was observed in a private conversation with Brent Bullock,
administrative assistant to the County Attorney and a chief
prosecution witness.

It was later disclosed that Mr. Laursen

and Mr. Bullock's father had worked together fifteen years
and were close friends and that Mro Laursen was inquiring of
Mr. Bullock's father's health following an accident wherein
the senior Mr. Bullock had fallen off a roof (T.222).

A

second motion for mistrial based upon the apparent prejudice
of the jurors was made and denied (Tol45).
Counsel argued

th~the

jurors were or should have

been examined to determine the extent of their familiarity
with the complaining witness, Chief Michael Ferre, and other
police officers testifying on behalf of the State.

Clearly,

such information is necessary to determine challenges for
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cause or for a rational exercise of preemptory challenges.
The court concluded, "I think you waived it" and
furthermore, that there is nothing to show that "an
acquaintanceship or whatever with Mr. Ferre would be prejudicial to this case" (T.l07,108).
Under Utah law, responsibility for properly examining prospective jurors rests exclusively with the trial court.
77-28-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953), As Amended, provides:
"TRIAL JURY--Trial juries for criminal
cases are formed in fue same manner as
trial juries in civil cases, except that
the examination of the jurors shall be
conducted by the judge, the judge may
permit counsel for either side to examine
the jurors, but such examination by counsel
shall be limited by the court. 11 (Emphasis
added).
When defense counsel attempted to inquire as to the
extent of the relationship between prospective jurors and law
enforcement officers, the court cut counsel off stating,
"I 1 11 ask that question 11 and then went on to say, "Have any
of you or your immediate families been engaged in law enforcement work?"

(T.6).

The judge carefully avoided any inquiry as to the
"acquaintences" the jurors might have had among law enforcement officers.
'~o,

The trial judge rebuked defense counsel saying,

I don't think you said anything about acquaintences.
-8-

I

don't think we can go that far, anyway, as far as acquaintences are concerned, I don't think we should go that far."
(T.74).
'~ell,

He further clarified his position later by stating,
I think you could have asked me to ask that question.

I'm not sure how far I'd havegone even if you had asked it,
though."

(T.l08).
In any event, defense counsel was deterred from

exploring the matter more closely by the judge's hostility
to the questions and his insistence on asking the questions
himself.

To get to the issue by a more circuitous route,

defense counsel asked if any of the jurors "have a predisposition to give more credence to a law enforcement officer's
testimony ••• simply because •.. they are ••• law enforcement
officers."
Again, the court rephrased and redirected the question
to the jurors and the following colloquy occurred:
MR. ELLINGTON:

Your Honor, I don't know that I

would do that, but I think that I should mention that I am
acquainted with Mr. Ferre and Mr. Blackhurst on the force.
I see them here this morning.
THE COURT:

And they may be called as witnesses,

isn't that right Mr. Wootton?
MRo WOOTTON:

Yes, sir.

_q_

Well, no.

I don't have

either Mr. Blackhurst or Mr. Ferre lined up.
just one brief portion, your Honor.

Mr. Ferre on

They were involved in

the investigation, however (T.7).
The prosecutor's reply was both inaccurate and
misleading.

It implied that Chief Ferre would not be called

to testify.

Furthermore, it failed to disclose that Chief

Ferre was the complaining witness, (R.l) the Pleasant Grove
police chief responsible for conducting the investigation
into the death of the deceased (T.69), and the officer to be
allowed to sit at counsel's table throughout the trial when
other prospective witnesses were excluded (T.24,25).
It is basic hornbook law that every person charged
with crime has an absolute and fundamental right to a fair
and impartial trial and the duty rests on the courts cmd the
prosecuting attorney to see that this right is upheld and
sustained.
Under Utah law, it is submitted that the tria 1 court
has total responsibility for, and control over, the examination of jurors and as such had a responsibility to require
the State to fully disclose the identities of all witnesses
which the State would rely upon to prosecute the charge.
The court then had an obligation to examine the prospective
jurors to determine the extent of their relationships and
-10-

acquaintance with each of the State's witnesses, particularly
the complaining witness.
When the State failed to disclose the complaining
witness and/or misrepresented his involvement, as was done in
this case, the court should grant a mistrial and select a new
panel of jurors.

It should be noted that this trial was less

than two hours old when the irregularities were first called
to the attention of the trial judge.
In U.S. v. Cavell, 287 F.2d 792 (1961), in reversing
a state murder conviction, the court declared of a tainted
juror:
'We rest our decision on the firm
ground that Stephenson in declaring himself to be impartial and without prejudice,
while not revealing that he was the sonin-law of the County Detective who was one
of the investigative officers in the very
matter to be tried, who was to be a
material witness at the trial, and whose
testimony Stephenson would believe created
an intolerable situation that resulted in
fundamentally unfair trial to appellant."
It is submitted that the undisclosed familiarity
between jurors Holman and Laursen and officers Bullock and
Ferre also created an intolerable situation resulting in a
fundamentally unfair trial for appellant.

-11-

POINT IIo
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT 1 S
REQUEST TO DISMISS THE IMPANELED JURY AND HAVE HIS CASE
TRIED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE SITTING WITHOUT JURYo
After appellant's motion for mistrial based upon
the lack of impartiality of the jurors was denied a second
time, he then moved in open court to dismiss the jury and
have all issues of fact heard by the trial judge (T.l45).
He stated that from the actions observed, "I don't think
that this particular jury would be fair

to me."

The tria 1 judge took the motion under

(T.147).
advisE~ment

and did not formally rule upon it until the time set :for
sentencing when he entered a written denial of the motion,
stating as the basis for its opinion:
" ••• that the defendant does not have a
federal constitutional right to be tried
by the court - as he does to be tried by
a jury. That whether or not a jury may
be waived and a defendant tried by the
court is within the sound discretion of
the court and that there was no abuse of
discretion in this case, particularly in
view of the fact that the first attempt
at a jury waiver and trial by the court
came after the State had presented its
evidence."
(R.97}.

Appellant's right to waive trial by jury is estab-12-

lished by Utah statutory law not federal constitutional law.
77-27-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) As Amended, outlines
appellant's right to waive trial by jury, stating:
"Issues of fact must be tried by a jury,
but in all cases except where a sentence
of death may be imposed trial by jury may
be waived by the defendant. Such waiver
shall be made in open court and entered
in the minutes." (Emphasis added).
The right of waiver provided by the Utah Legislature
is unqualified and leaves nothing to the "discretion" of the
trial judge.

The issue as to whether or not the trial judge

has discretion to deny appellant's right to waive trial by
jury appears to be of first impression with this court.
In other jurisdictions, however, the law appears
to be clear.

Where the State has acted to grant the defendant

an unconditional right to waive trial by jury as the Utah
Legislature has done, the prevailing authority is that neither
the court nor the prosecutor can deny this waiver.

The logic

is well summarized in 25 Mich.L.Rep. (p.736) where it is
stated:
'~f

trial by jury, as we have been
contending, is a protection for the
benefit of the individual, then it is
hardly consistent to require also the
consent of the court, or the prosecuting
attorney, or both, as a condition
precedent to a trial without jury. The
act of the Legislature is itself consent
by the State; and there is a curious

contrariety in calling jury trial a
privilege and then making its surrender
subiect to the control of the court."
Where the State has acted to grant a right to
waive trial by jury as has the state of Utah, state courts
have uniformaly respected that right.

In Grady v. State,

(1931) Tex. Crim. Rep., 35 S.W.2d, 158, a defendant sought to
waive the jury but the District Attorney demanded trial by
jury and such was had with a verdict of guilty.

In reversing

on appeal, the court stated:
'The matter is not an open question.
The Constitution recognizes the right of
one accused of a misdemeanor to waive a
jury, and the statute . . • emphasizes
this right. It has frequently been expressed and held that the right was one
the exercise of which it was not within
the power of the court to deny."
In State v. Smith, (1931) 121 Ohio St., 237, 147
NoE. 758, the court held that upon arraignment and pl,ea of

an accused the statutory provisions giving him the right to
waive a jury and to elect to be tried by the court are mandatory, and that the court has no power to reject the accused's
waiver and order the case to be tried by a jury unless it
comes to the notice of the court the accused is not sane.
The court observed:
'Were there no statutory provision conferring the right upon the defendant to
waive a jury and be tried by the court, a
-14-

different situation would be presented.
But where the state law confers the right
as it has here, it cannot be successfully
claimed that the prosecution or the court
may ignore the law."
See also People v. Martin,(l931) 256 Mich. 33,
239 NoWo 341 and People v. Steele, (1882) 94 Mich. 437, 54
NoWo 171, where the court held that the accused has a choice
of two modes of trial and that such is a "substantial right
of which the court could not deprive him 0"
It is not possible or practical for this writer to
list the multitude of constitutional and statutory provisions
in other jurisdictions affecting the right of an accused to
waive a trial by jury.

It is enough to note that many juris-

dictions have not granted an unqualified right of waiver as
hasthe state of Utah.

Federal law requires the consent of

the government's counsel and the sanction of the court.

Patton

v. United States, 281 US 276, SO S. Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854
(1930).

The state of Arizona, without benefit of legislative

directive, has chosen to follow the federal rule.
v. Durham, 111 Ariz. 19, 523 P.2d 47 (1974).

See Arizona

The New Mexico

Supreme Court confronted by a constitutional provision
establishing the right to trial by jury and in absence of any
statute authorizirgwaiver of said right has ruled that a
defendant cannot waive his "right" to trial by jury in a felony
-15-

case without leave of the court where the state decline:s to
consent and formally objects thereto.

See State Ex. Rel.

Gutierrez v. First Judicial Dist. Court Within and For
McKinley County, 191 P.2d 334, 52 NaM. 28.
The State should not be heard to argue that somehow
this defendant is estopped to assert his right to waive trial
by jury by failing to do so until the jury had been impaneled
and the State had presented its evidence.
precedence to rebut such an argument.

There is certainly

The Oregon Supreme

Court found proper a waiver of jury in a first degree murder
trial wherein the jury was waived by the defendant contrary
to advice of court and counsel after the State had rested
following four days of presenting evidence.

The appellant

court concluded that the defendant's reasons for waiver were
"entirely rationa 1."

His reasons of record were, (1)1 he had

noted a juror glaring at him, (2) he did not trust the jury,
and (3) he believed the judge would be ''broader
regular people."

mindt~d

than

Oregon v. Swint, 475 P.2d 434 (1970).

In Baader v. State, (1917) 201 Ala. 76, 76 So. 370,
the court succinctly summarized the same issues now before
this court and concluded:
'~ny

other construction of the act
would put it in the power of the state's
counsel to deny, or render nugatory, the
defendant's right of waiver of a trial
-16-

by jury under the constitution and the
statutes having application. That such
was the legislative intent is refuted by
the history of the waiver by defendants of
such constitutional rights as averted
to • • • The substitution of a jury trial
by the judge of the court at the instance
of the state in the case at bar was an
unauthorized exercise of supposed judicial
discretion; it finding no support in the
constitution or in statutes." (Emphasis
added).
Appellant respectfully submits that under Utah law
the trtal court's denial of appellant's request to waive trial
i

by jury was also "an unauthorized exercise of supposed judicial
discretion."

Appellant cannot be criticized for his timing in

submitting his request to waive this jury.

He was alert and

observing and called the court's attention immediately to the
problems of this jury with motions for mistrial.

When these

motions were denied, he moved promptly to rid himself of
the tainted jury by the only means left available to him.
The motion to waive the jury was made at the close of the
State's evidence but before commencement of defense's case.
It should be noted that nowhere in this record
was appellant ever advised that there were any deadlines
after which a waiver of jury was subject to the "discretion"
of the trial court.

-17-

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AS THE EVIDENCE WAS
INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION
OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
To establish the crime of murder in the second
degree the State must prove that a killing was "unlawful,"
"intentiona 1," and with ''malice a forethought," and the
State has a burden to prove each of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt (Instruction 15}.
There were no witnesses to the shooting and the
State relied upon circumstantial evidence in its effort to
prove the elements of the alleged crime.

The State's evidence

consisted of testimony by a barmaid that Mr. Black was with
the deceased an hour and one-half prior to her death (T.28)
and the testimony of a witness described by the prosecutor as
"an old a lcoho lie" who ''has a difficult time remembering"
(T.73}, that he overheard an argument, threats and what could
be described as a beating of the deceased in her room sometime
prior to her death (T.l24-132}.

The State's evidence estab-

lished that the cause of death was a gunshot wound, not a
beating (T.49).
The State produced no evidence as to what occurred
-18-

immediately prior to the shooting.

The State's witnesses

testified that he had "relaxed" and was "partly asleep when
the gun went off," and that the next thing he heard was an
exclamation, "God, honey, I didn't mean to do it!",and
immediately thereafter, he heard

what'~ounded

like a shuffling

of feet, and then the door opened, then shut, then a car door
opened and shut, and the lights came on, and the car started."
(T.l27).

He went on to testify that the exclamation and the

departure all occurred within a ''matter of seconds" and
"about as fast as it could happen" after the gun had discharged (T.l28).
It is possible that defendant waited until tempers
had cooled and then picked up the gun and intentionally shot
the deceased in the head.

To conclude that such in fact

happened requires the rankest form of speculation.

One must

totally ignore Mr. Black's testimony that the gun discharged
accidentally and his actions thereafter which support his
claim of an accident and no other conclusion.

His exclamat-

ion, ''My God, honey, I didn't mean to do it!", and his wild
dash at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour from Pleasant
Grove through Orem to the Emergency Room of the Utah Valley
Hospital in Provo rebut all inference of any intent to kill.
From this evidence, there can be no doubt that the

-19-

jury did in fact speculate and ignored jury instruction
number nine advising them in part as follows:
"If the evidence in this case is
susceptible of two constructions or
interpretations, each of which appears
to you to be reasonable, and one of
which points to the guilt of the defendant, and the other to his innocence,
it is your duty, under the law, to adopt
the interpretation which will admit to
the defendant's innocence, and reject
that which points to his guilt." (R.61).
There can be no doubt that the evidence before the
court was susceptible to an interpretation that the shooting
was accidental.

The prosecutor acknowledged in open court,

"I don't think there's any question about the fact that there
is evidence by which the jury could reasonably conclude an
accident or murder."

(T.l36).

This jury had been properly instructed that:
"The killing of a human being was excusable and not unlawful when committed by an
accident and misfortune in doing any lawful
act by lawful means • • • • " (Instruction 13,

R.57)o
The jury was further instructed:

"o •• that to warrant a conviction on
circumstantial evidence, each fact
necessary to establish the guilt of the
accused must be proved by competent
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and
the facts and circumstances proven
should not only be consistent with the
guilt of the accused but must be inconsistent with any other reasonable
hypothesis • • . • " (Instruction 24,R.46)

o

To allow the ;ury verdict of guilty to stand
constitutes a judicial acceptance and ratification of this
jury's refusal to follow the court's instructions.

Such

renders useless this iury as a fact-finding body, and
deprives this appellant of his rights to a fair trial.
In light of the evidence presented by the State, this case
should never have been allowed to go to the jury.

Appellant

was entitled to a dismissal of the Second Degree Murder
charge as a matter of law.
POINT IV.
IT WAS IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL FOR THE PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY TO ARGUE MATTERS NOT IN EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PREJUDICING THE JURY AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
During the trial, the prosecution produced a rag,
which a police officer characterized as a "skirt."

It was

offered into evidence with no other identification than the
statement that it was found in a paper bag with a "bra."
Appellant had testified he had ripped the bra off the deceased
when she slapped him.
In his argument to the jury, the County Attorney
made an emotional appeal for deceased, stating:
"It's difficult for me to present a
picture to you of Barbara Owens as a
human being. But I want you to understand that she's something besides
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simply a piece of meat that's now been
buried. I concede I haven't got much
left of her. I've got a torn dress,
I've got a torn bra, I 1ve got a picture
of her, and I've got her drivers license.
And that's all. • • . (T.l89). (Emphasis
added} •
• • • He was mad. He had been drinking.
He was jealous. He had beat her for almost an hour, apparently very violently.
If you'll examine, much more violently
than he says. All you've got to do is
look at the marks and look at the torn
dress, which he didn't mention, incidentally.
According to him 2 she took it off herself." (T .193). (Emphasis added}.
At this point, defense counsel objected but the
damage had been done and the trial court took no action to
set the record straight (T.l93}.
This~gument

improper.

by the prosecuting attorney was totally

There was no testimony from any witness that the

rag was ever deceased's "skirt" or that it had ever been worn
by her as any form of clothing, much less a "dress."
Clearly, the prosecutor was arguing that which was
not in evidence and his arguments were in no way a good-faith
interpretation of the evidence.

Appellant had testified:

"During the time that we went home,
we was arguing, and we argued after we
got there. She went in and took a
shower. She come out of the shower,
and she put her bra and stuff back on.
And we got into another argument over
I told her I was ~aving, and she told
-:-22-

me not to. Then she slapped me, and I
jerked her bra off." (T.l59).
The prosecutor knew or should have known that
there was no evidence identifying this rag as a "dress"
much less decedent's dress.

His argument to the iury identify-

ing it as such coupled with the clear inference that
appellant lied by not stating he tore it off her and by
saying that she took it off itself was clearly calculated
to prejudice defendant by further characterizing him as a
liar and a brute.
It is improper for the prosecutor to go outside
the record and make argument for the sole purpose of appealing to the passion and prejudice of the jurors.
State, 238 P.2d 384, 95 Okl. Cr. 14.

Sykes v.

It is natural and

necessary that the counsel for the State should have the mind
of an advocate but the County Attorney, as representative of
the people, is bound to refrain from making inflamatory statements and is bound by a somewhat higher duty of fairness than
is the ordinary practitioner in a court of law.

People v.

Vienne, 297 P.2d 1027, 142 C.A.2d 172.
The trial Court erred by admitting the rag into
evidence without proper identification or foundation and
over the objection of defense counsel as to its relevancy
(T.l86).

The prosecutor's use of this seemingly innocuous

bit of evidence made its admission prejudicial and grounds
for reversal.

Its admission and use as specified deprived

this defendant of a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
The individual and cumulative effect of the foregoing assigned errors is clearly and uncontrovertedly prejudicial and reversible error.
Appellant therefcre prays that the conviction and
iudgment against appellant be reversed and appellant be discharged, or in the alternative, that the case be reversed
and remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MARSH, Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant
1018 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah 84401
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